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DEFENDING AMERICA

By WM. J. ROE

NEWBURGH, N. Y.

THE problem of discovering or inventing a method of preparation against aggression which shall be acceptable to the entire American people is now presenting itself for solution with an insistence never before so strong or determined. Until in August a year ago the war-cloud broke over Europe, with the solitary exceptions of those versed in the swiftly increasing powers for defence and offence of the continental nations, or aware of the continually strained racial relations, the average well-meaning citizen of the United States seemed fairly confident that something very like a millennial dawn had come. Good people, respectable, well educated, church members, in their way patriotic, but a little over a year ago were saying to each other and sometimes in print to other citizens, that the world had progressed too far along the broad highway of progress for anything like a great war again to disturb the repose of the nations. The recent records of South Africa and our own war with Spain these excellent people dismissed as mere incidents of a universal slowing down of humanity's depraved instincts, or rather perhaps as "growing pains" of the angel of peace.

With all their education (for almost invariably these excellent theorists and impractical interpreters of principles which passed with them as "religious," were "educated") the philosophy of history and the rudimentary elements of psychology had taught nothing concerning the realities of the past or the prospects of immediate present or remote future. One would think that with the great European war a full year upon its course, with no end as yet in view upon the most optimistic horizon, these genial optimists would somehow or in some degree have revised their estimates of probability, or at least have devoted some serious attention to those dilemmas of our past which when understood so completely refute the arguments of "peace at any price" idealists.

Unfortunately the hideous spectacle of the European conflict, instead of having turned the attention of the ultra-pacifists to the untenability of their amiable sophistries, seems to have greatly increased their ardor in the cause of pacification, and immeasurably to have intensified the clamor of ignorant opinion as to the method of insuring peace.

Believing (with the astronomer) that it is only by determining points upon the orbit of the past that man is able to forecast at all the

trajectory of the future, the sane peace lover calls attention to the incidents of our war for independence. "Why!" the peace-at-any-price person responds, and sometimes with no little display of spirit, "Why, my dear sir, that was a righteous struggle; the people rose like one man, and drove the tyrant from these shores." It is in vain that you point to the fallacy of this harangue. It would of course be the rankest of heresies to claim—in spite of the lengthy list of iniquities in the preamble to our declaration—that George III. was not so much of a tyrant, after all, and that the war of liberation from British sovereignty was fought "on a preamble." But this is true, nevertheless; the thirteen colonies sought freedom because they were tired of being "bossed." They found pretexts for revolution in Patrick Henry's "Give me liberty or give me death," and in that excellent and serviceable aphorism; "Taxation without representation is tyranny." The people of the colonies won their freedom, and used it to their hearts' content to establish states, which ever since have taxed unrepresented—or inadequately represented—sections, with hardly a murmur, certainly without a hint of revolution.

But this is not the only—nor the worse—fallacy. The people rose like one man, did they? Most assuredly this was not all that happened. They rose indeed, everywhere along the seaboard from the province of Maine to the far South; but it was like a mob they rose, untrained, insubordinate, in general fair marksmen, but for squirrels rather than men, splendid material for armies, but so ill disciplined—at least till Washington took them in hand at Cambridge—that their assemblages were more like training-day musters than the van of war. Great man as he was even Washington could hardly have succeeded in molding mobs into soldiers if his efforts had not been finely aided by those gallant Germans, Steuben, Pulaski and Du Kalb. Indeed the philosophical analysis of conditions resulting in final success of American arms at Yorktown discloses most certainly that independence was due to three prominent factors: the gallantry and "war-sense" of Benedict Arnold at Saratoga, bringing about Burgoyne's surrender, and thereby the French alliance. Without that and the cordial aid of La Fayette, De Fleury, Rochambeau and others of that military nation, Cornwallis would doubtless have dealt with our forces on the York as easily and cleverly as he outflanked and outmanoeuvred Washington at the Brandywine.

And the war—so called—of 1812, what a wretched account of themselves our hastily gathered land forces gave; with the single "saving grace" of New Orleans, fought after the war had ended, the records include merely a discreditable series of defeats, routs, retreats and surrenders. Only the audacity and skill of an ill-prepared, manned and munitioned navy saved the country from total and irremediable dis-

aster. But fortunately the navy was audacious and skillful; it fought everywhere "to a finish," gave us a very real standing upon the high seas, and as a priceless heritage the illustrious names of Decatur and Lawrence and Porter and Perry and MacDonough, and their many hardly less worthy subordinates.

In Mexico, for the first time in our history (apart from the services of the few graduates of West Point, mainly utilized in the construction of fortifications in 1812-14) the country had the benefit of a large number of officers trained at the Military Academy in the science and art of warfare. Under the able leadership of Scott, Wool, Worth, and Harney these young "graduated cadets" so efficiently led the few thousands, mostly volunteers, against a nation in arms, that peace was achieved in a few months, which otherwise might have required many years.

To recount the incidents of the opening of our great Civil War, or even to touch upon them with a too truthful pencil, would, it may not be doubted, in any other country in the world, be to awaken memories that had better be left to slumber and oblivion. But to Americans of to-day the horror and the gloom of half a century ago have passed forever; to us—South and North—the years when the land was "drenched in fraternal blood" are no more than the wars of Marius and Sylla, or the roses—white and red—of the rival lines of Plantagenet.

The peril of "states dissevered, discordant, belligerent," was averted by force of arms. Arguments failed, or intensified the rancor; diplomacy was unheeded, compromise scornfully rejected; there remained only force, the first appeal of passion met by the last resort of patriotism. Force succeeded, but at what a frightful cost! hundreds of thousands of lives, billions of money. It can not be said that surely all these expenditures might have been saved if in the year 1861 we had had a force of fifty thousand men in arms. But though such a force, guided by one calm cool head at Washington, might not have averted the conflict, the strong probabilities are that at least they would have served to give time for passions to subside, and for reason to resume her rightful sway.

The almost total unpreparedness of our scant land forces at the outbreak of the Spanish war had the effect—temporarily at least—to call the attention of the nation to our deficiencies. For a time the glaring maladministration of military affairs of the department at Washington was a public scandal; that we won, and so quickly, was due largely of course to the very great efficiency of the small navy, but far more that the Spaniard, though passionate as he was valorous, was yet no fool; he recognized and accepted the inevitable, even though his forces in Cuba overmatched our own in numbers nearly sixfold.

Since the peace of Paris our military affairs have been placed upon

a basis far exceeding anything previously known to ensure efficiency, especially by the establishment of the General Staff, replacing former lax administration by a supervising authority, coordinating all branches of the service under a single responsible direction. Unhappily for the strength of our armament for defense on land, while there has been no increase of forces authorized by Congress, the necessity for an increase has come from the very considerable territorial expansion consequent upon the acquisition of the Philippines, Porto Rico, the Canal Zone, and the islands of the Pacific. Adequately to police these new possessions—saying nothing of their defense against possible foreign aggression—would require an army very much larger than that now established by law.

The American people as a whole are very easily scared (that is, startled), but very difficult to frighten (that is, to disturb by fear). To say this is in a way complimentary more to the value of our emotions than to our reason, for certainly the courage of the naturally timid and "nervous" is more commendable than the stolid bravery that merely lacks imagination. But it is unfortunate, for, as all of our emotions are designed for utility and not brutality, fright has its use in way of warning, distinctly notifying the frightened to take steps to avert the threatened danger. But Japan signified unmistakably her vexation, and Mexico her contempt, without arousing the American people to a consciousness of either possible peril or certain responsibility. We disregarded Japan's grievance as of no real importance, and as for the Mexicans, knowing that from them was no danger of invasion, we have given absolutely no thought to what the future may disclose concerning our obligations as trustee according to the Monroe Doctrine to foreign powers.

From this condition—a mingling of bravado, apathy and indifference—the great war in Europe has thoroughly aroused the American nation. All over the United States, from politicians, editors, essayists, "militarists," and "peace-at-any-price" people, come addresses, pamphlets, articles, serials professing to forecast perils from foreign invasion, while societies are being organized, some to stimulate interest in military affairs, and some to discourage such interest, even to the extent of endeavoring to affix a stigma upon the soldier by ostracism and unpatriotic ditties denouncing him as a murderer.

And this discordance is further complicated by varying opinions concerning the respective merits of the causes now rending the continent of Europe, opinions for the most part expressed guardedly and with at least some consideration for others, but fixed in racial sympathies.

At best the position of a neutral nation in any war of considerable magnitude is liable to become perilous, especially to a nation having an

extensive foreign commerce. We know what occurred over a century ago when Europe was overrun by the armies of Napoleon—that international compacts were disregarded, the rights of neutrals ignored, and our own merchant marine threatened with annihilation by paper edicts. A similar process has already been begun across the Atlantic; already we have had thrust upon us a “Berlin decree” from Germany, and “Orders in council” from Great Britain. Doubtless the offense of Germany against the law of nations has been by far the most flagrant; but Great Britain—by interfering with the trade of one neutral nation with another—has exhibited a disregard of that law in relation to our trade with countries bordering upon Germany, which (notwithstanding our own precedents) has caused strenuous remonstrance. That both nations—with great civility and with deference to our colossal growth since 1800—set up as a plea in bar of action a necessity justifying—or condoning—action, merely adds to the difficulties which already confront America, and which are certain to continue and increase as trouble-making incidents.

As never before in our history we are surrounded by conditions and latent grievances liable at almost any moment to take on the shape of antagonisms. In venturing to point out—one by one—the chances of the future, it is not to invite unfriendly feeling towards our neighboring nations, but solely that with calm dispassion we may view the facts, having always in mind that great certainty, that adequate preparation to repel an invader is better than enormous armaments to expel him.

With Japan we need not, I think, concern ourselves unduly. This is not to minimize the danger of a disruption of friendly relations owing to further inimical legislation by states of the Pacific coast or to a possible attempt at colonization of lands theoretically under our protection; but mainly that the Japanese are too poor and at the same time too clever seriously to incite our hostility. Poverty alone will never deter a high-spirited nation from seeking reprisals for real or fancied wrongs, and cleverness alone is apt to lead (as in the case of the German Kaiser) to over confidence in cleverness; but the two combined are fairly good safeguards against aggression.

But it is not against the probable so much as the possible that America ought to be prepared. In the present state of our defenses on both land and sea, war with Japan would mean the immediate loss of our Asiatic, and probably of our Pacific, possessions; the Philippines, with Samoa, Guam, and almost certainly the Hawaiian islands, would—temporarily at least—be lost to us. That they would not stay lost may be reckoned upon, and this is known to the keen intellect of the Japanese, perhaps even more thoroughly than to ourselves.

But why should America depend upon the forbearance of an alien—

however induced—for our first line of defense? Especially is this undesirable when already we possess outlying salients susceptible of being so fortified as virtually to insure us against invasion of our continental territory. Already we are fortifying Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, and it needs only similar fortifications of one of the Aleutian islands, with Guam and Samoa in the far southeast, with perhaps by treaty another base at the Galapagos, to establish bases for swift offense against the supplies of an Asiatic enemy and for protection of the Panama Canal. So protected by outlying fortresses having defensive relations, we should be virtually invulnerable from an Asiatic assault. As compared with the probable loot of an invader on the western coast the expense of constructing and maintaining such defenses would be inconsiderable.

Curious as it may seem, while invasion by a Mexican army is something to be contemplated with complacency, the danger which may arise from that quarter is far more menacing. At the present moment of course the powers of western Europe have enough to do without seeking trouble in America. But suppose there had been no war to engage the attention of either Great Britain or Germany; is it likely that either country would have permitted the spoliation and murder of its citizens to go on as it has for several years, life and property at the mercy of one or the other of a number of irresponsible bandits? Certainly that could not have been expected. With courteous diplomacy no doubt, due deference being accorded to our Monroe doctrine, a demand in no uncertain terms would have come long before this; we should have been required either to "fish or cut bait"; either to act the part our doctrine clearly calls for of collecting agent, or to let the creditor do his own collecting unvexed.

At the present time of writing signs are not lacking that the extraordinary patience heretofore held to by the administration at Washington is on the verge of exhaustion. An endeavor has been made to secure the moral support of the stable South American countries in an appeal to the contending factions. Even yet it seems doubtful whether the only sort of action that can possibly be effective is contemplated; more likely the policy of pottering procrastination will continue. The ultra peace lovers and optimists will tell you that there is no need of haste, assuring you that the close of the European war will find the nations so battered, so weary of strife, and so exhausted financially as to be unwilling or unable to turn their attention to the redress of wrongs suffered by their citizens in Mexico. Such imaginings are wholly erroneous; as never before will the armies of the victors in that great struggle be in shape for further conquests, while the very fact of poverty will be merely an incentive to the replenishment of an exhausted treasury. When that day comes America will surely have to choose between war and humiliation.

These being the inevitable prospects of the future for the American people, certainly it becomes the duty of every thinking citizen to do his part, however insignificant, towards calling attention to the perils, not needlessly to alarm, but soberly, calmly, judiciously, not only to seek a permanent peace, but by far-sighted preparation for a war of strictest defense, to ensure it.

Situated as America is, having an isolated continent virtually to itself, the problem of defense assumes a shape vastly different from that of one of the continental European nations, surrounded by countries whose endemic jealousy is liable at any moment to become virulently epidemic. To a very large number of Americans, probably the great majority, the sudden and violent action of Germany last year seems cruelly and needlessly aggressive. This paper is not written to assail or to defend those actions, but it may be well, while criticizing, if you please, the violation of international law involved in the invasion of Belgium, to put yourself in Germany's place, realizing, if that be possible, her dilemma, believing (as was certainly the case) that hostile Europe lay crouching ready to spring upon her. We know what happened; Germany endeavored to forestall the attack by attacking first and fiercely.

Assuming (though the assumption may be very far from correctly taken) the necessity imposed by an unavoidable antagonism, Germany's action was not only logical, but was called for by the genius of the art of war. The method of that genius has been stated—having been quite erroneously credited to a distinguished Confederate—as “getting there fustest with the mostest men.”

A century ago the Atlantic ocean served as a very efficient rampart for resistance against an offensive movement; to-day, when an army could easily be transported to our coast within a month its merit as a first line of defense depends almost solely upon the floating force at our command. In no event probably could any naval armament at our service wholly eliminate all danger of invasion; but to reduce this peril to a minimum, and to some extent to direct the course and point of attack, a very considerable addition to our present navy is not only desirable, but imperative. We need more battleships of the first class, we need swift cruisers, and lesser craft, for offence and for supply, and perhaps more than all, many—little and big—submarines. With an adequate force of all these, and (for both sea and land service) a host of all classes of aircraft, it may safely be said that the best has been done to avert the calamity of an assault from the high seas of an invader.

In one respect America is singularly exposed; the vast preponderance of wealth lies directly upon our Atlantic frontier; Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington are all either directly on the seaboard, or within easy striking distance of some point of disembarkation of an enemy. It is not difficult to forecast an invader's inten-

tion—to concentrate his force, for purposes of loot or ransom, against these rich nuclei of treasure.

As on a preceding page I have pointed out the propriety of fortifying various islands of the Pacific ocean as the simplest and least expensive method of defense against an armed attack from the far East, so—for the best defense of our seaboard metropolitan cities—I wish most emphatically to call renewed attention to the project (so long and so ably urged by the “Atlantic Deeper Waterways Association”) of constructing ship canals capable of passing the heaviest battleships, between existing navigable channels “from Boston to Beaufort” and beyond. Especially should there be deep waterways from Boston—inland—to Narragansett Bay; thence back of Point Judith to connect with Long Island Sound (defended by a powerful work to be constructed on Block Island); again via the Kill-van-Kull and across the state of New Jersey, to the Delaware, and, more important still, across the Maryland-Delaware peninsula to deep water in the Chesapeake bay.

The great fortification planned and now in process of construction opposite Cape Henry at the entrance to the Chesapeake will eventually tend to safeguard that extensive inland sea and the cities of Baltimore and Washington. With an artificial channel adequately defended from the upper Chesapeake to the Delaware, the extreme danger of an enemy’s establishing a base somewhere on the Chesapeake (most available of all locations) could probably be prevented.

The general purpose and necessary brevity of this paper precludes anything like a detailed statement of the present inadequacies in way of land defenses of our cities and harbors. On the supposition that our seagoing defenders have been baffled in their endeavor to prevent an enemy from landing upon our coast, and establishing there his base, from which he proposes to advance, it may be well in as few words as possible to outline the composition of our land force upon which—and now upon which alone—we must rely, either to drive the enemy back whence he came or at least to prevent the destruction or spoliation of our great cities.

The personnel of the land defense divides naturally into these general classes: the stationary defenders (consisting at present of 170 companies of an authorized strength of 104 men each) who man the seacoast batteries, the “mobile army,” the “supply,” and the “transportation.”

The bulk of a “mobile army” consists of infantry, that is of bodies of men, divided into companies, battalions, regiments, brigades, divisions, and army corps, who rely—as final resort—upon their own legs to carry them into action; of field artillery, armed with large-caliber, long-range guns, smaller “mountain guns,” with “machine guns” the latter usually attached to the infantry, but which may be drawn as the others are by horses or mules, together with their attendant “limbers” and “caissons” carrying the immediate supplies of ammunition. Besides these arms is

the cavalry, differing but slightly in training and arms except that they are mounted, Whose purpose is ordinarily scouting in small detached bodies, or—should such action become desirable—for raids on a large scale, or even, in some contingency quite remote in modern warfare, for a charge *en masse*.

In addition to these three branches of the service of an active army—infantry, cavalry and field artillery, a number of auxiliary troops are required to make up a complete and efficient fighting force. The engineers make and repair roads and bridges, construct earthworks and lay pontoon bridges when required; the signal corps, the aviators, the medical department, and the quartermaster corps, having in charge all matters pertaining to the feeding, tenting, paying, transporting, and clothing of the troops. There are also other staff departments, consisting of officers only, who are charged with details of administration.

While the questions of supply and transportation of a mobile army fall naturally and mainly upon the quartermaster and his assistant officers and the men of their command, many other considerations enter into the carrying out of the various problems as they arise. Not the least of the perils which might arise from invasion is that almost all the sources of arms and munitions in this country are located not very far from the Atlantic coast, and so within striking distance of an invader. Upon our Ordnance Department rests the responsibility of making and supplying guns, cannon, machine-guns, and small-arms, as well as ammunition—explosives and projectiles of all kinds. The arsenals and armories under the control of the War Department are even now, and would be of course to a greater extent in time of actual war, supplemented by the output of private concerns.

Thus theoretically may be described the essential elements of America's defense against a possible future assault by an enemy having a measurable command of the high seas sufficient to convoy in safety adequate armed forces in strength and numbers really threatening. For the purpose of repelling such an invasion, not only should all of our seacoast forts be manned and officered by a largely increased number of technically trained artillerists, but the fortifications—especially those guarding the approaches to the great cities—should be vastly strengthened—single forts and batteries united in a continuous line of defensive relations, in effect converting scattered groups of isolated works into one scientifically planned fortress. Doubtless at the first sign of real threatening word from Washington, flashing over the wires, would send local commanders to the task of further fortifying in earnest. But the conviction can not be escaped that such hasty preparation would come too late.

As for that "mobile army" which has been briefly described, in general terms this should be distributed perhaps into say three or four grand divisions; one somewhere in the far-south, located so as best to defend

the Texan frontier and the Gulf ports; one somewhere not far from Washington; another probably near Trenton, N. J., and still another at some point in New England about equidistant between Boston and New York. Each section of the active army should be composed of every element, should have at easy command both material and personnel for replenishment of inevitable losses, and each should be so located that by railway and highway and perhaps waterway lines prompt and decisive access to the enemy's landing place might be effected; be ready in short not to await the initiative, but to take it.

To write in this lofty way of fortresses and armies, and of taking initiatives with a view to driving an enemy promptly from our territory, must, I am well aware, appear quite ludicrous to military men. With a force of coast artillery wholly inadequate already, and a "mobile" force so tiny as to be utterly meaningless, to speak of defense, much less of victory, seems like very real mockery. To-day (I have no hesitation in saying) if any one single European power of the first class sought war with the United States, and was left unimpeded by any other great power, this country, in spite of its wealth, its numbers, its patriotism, would be hopelessly helpless.

The saying has been credited, I know not how truly, to a very honest, very religious, but very misguided politician, that in the event of a foreign power seeking to subjugate us, a million armed men would spring up over night to defend our beloved country, and to drive the foe from our shores. Such "spread-eagle" declamation may sound well in a Fourth-of-July speech, but practically it signifies worse than nothing. You may remember that when Julius Cæsar had crossed the Rubicon, and was advancing upon Rome his rival Pompey said to the populace: "Give yourselves no concern, Quirites, Rome is quite safe; all I have to do is to stamp my foot and many legions will arise to meet and vanquish Cæsar."

Most of the Roman citizens were well enough satisfied with this; they said to one another that Pompey was a great man, at least that he was a lover of peace, and had a fine gift for phrase-making. But before long news came that Cæsar had taken Corfinium and captured the army of Domitius. So the citizens came again—this time in a hurry—to Pompey's house, to say: "You promised to provide legions to defend us from Cæsar by stamping your foot; we merely wish to say that the time has come to stamp." Pompey was very polite to his callers, and replied that he would see that something was done; but nothing was, and when next we hear of Pompey it was as a fugitive from Pharsalia.

The analogy of the above anecdote is defective in several particulars; our people are by no means as ignorant or as apathetic as the Romans were, and certainly few of them have any sort of confidence that a defending army can be raised over night. In fact it is not the lack of stamping that is the trouble (for everybody seems busily engaged at

that), but that no one appears to have stamped for exactly the right thing, or at least not in exactly the right way. Some—the so-called ultra “militarists”—are demanding an immediate and huge standing army; some—the extreme “pacifists”—claim that a policy of complete non-resistance is the one most likely to be effectual. These good people quote the saying of the Master moralist of all time, as to his duty who is smitten upon the one cheek to turn the other also, forgetting that it was said as strenuously and by the same authority: “How can one enter into a strong man’s house and spoil his goods except he first bind the strong man!”

And between the extremes of “militarism” and “peace-at-any-price” how many varieties of urgent opinion are voicing their views! Some advocate compulsory teaching of tactics in the schools, some have great hopes from “boy scouts,” some, scandalized at the idea of any increase in the regular army—as likely to “imperil our liberties”—would be glad to see the militia of the several states amplified to almost any extent, and some, good citizens, having the welfare of the country at heart, establish drill organizations, learning something while having an enjoyable outing. Not one of all these notions and experiments but has in it elements of value, and no one would seek to disparage them; but in fact, in the event of a real war suddenly thrust upon us, all of these put together, including even those “continentals” now recommended to Congress, would hardly prove a feather’s weight towards that dynamic force which alone could suffice for defense. Probably the method and purpose of the organizations known as “The American Legion” and the “National Security League” whose headquarters are in New York City, are more likely to prove efficient as an auxiliary to a national army rightly recruited, organized, and officered, than all other adjuncts or volunteer aids combined.

The question of establishing an armed land force sufficiently numerous to repel any invasion at all likely to threaten the country must be considered from two different standpoints; first, as to what may be done by Congress under the constitution and the laws, and, second, what is feasible in view of the traditions of the American people and their evident distrust of any considerable “standing army.”

The constitution gives to congress the right to raise and support, govern and regulate an army, of which the president shall be commander-in-chief. Inasmuch as no limitation is placed upon the size of the army, manifestly it is within the legal powers of Congress to call every able-bodied citizen to serve as a soldier—to adopt if it sees fit the absolute militaristic system common to the countries of continental Europe, a system which finds perhaps its best illustration of combined efficiency and expediency in the military administration of the Swiss republic.

Included also among the powers expressly delegated to Congress is that which gives the right of “organizing, arming, and disciplining the

militia" and for employing these state forces in the service of the nation. The sole restriction upon federal authority over state troops when called into active service is that to the states is reserved the right to designate the officers and to do their own training subject to congressionally prescribed methods of discipline.¹

Manifestly it would be quite impracticable to introduce the Swiss system in its entirety into this country. The people would not submit to so radical an alternative, and again such a huge force, even if it could be officered, supplied or transported, would be too cumbersome and unwieldy for anything like efficiency. Our total present force consists of about 90,000 regular troops, and something over 100,000 militia all told, in all subject to the call of Congress and the President to-day, almost exactly 200,000 men under arms. Between this force and a "levy en masse" the golden mean of availability must therefore be found. That "volunteering" can be seriously relied upon to furnish a competent army of defense must be dismissed as untenable, if only because of the time required to convert an "armed mob" however patriotic, into veteran troops.

Having in view all the circumstances, conditions, resources and prospects—most of which have been at least touched upon, however lightly in this paper, it will be for the president to recommend and for Congress to enact such measures as shall most surely guarantee to America that assurance of safety from aggression which just dealing and diplomacy may go far towards effecting, but which an armed force of suitable strength, well armed and munitioned, and ably led alone can insure.

The virtually unanimous opinion of military men, founded upon the known results of practical experience of foreign countries and with our own army, and modified by an intelligent understanding of democratic needs and prejudices, is convincing that Congress should provide forthwith somewhat as follows:

I. For a very considerable increase of the *coast artillery*, the total, officers and men, to aggregate nearly if not quite 50,000.

II. Providing for an increase of the present *mobile force*—infantry and cavalry—the total to be not less than 150,000 and perhaps need not be more than 200,000. The grand total of the regular army to be from 200,000 to 250,000, preferably the larger aggregate.

III. Providing for an enlistment period which may be approximately eight years, of which two or three shall be *with the colors*—that is in active service, the balance of the enlistment period to be with the *reserve*, subject however always to rejoining the colors. These reserves to be adequately paid, but unrestricted as to occupation.

IV. Providing for prompt *expansion* of the active army in case of

¹ See Constitution, Article No. I., §§ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16, and Article No. II., Section 2, § 1; also Amendment No. II.

necessity, not by creating new organizations (of reserves or volunteer recruits), but by incorporating the reserves immediately, and the volunteers when sufficiently trained, with existing units of service.

V. Providing for an increase in number of *officers*; this to be by adding to the number of cadets at the Military Academy, and by commissioning such graduates of colleges and universities with the higher class of private schools, as may be proficient in an established military course directly under authority of the War Department.

VI. Providing for the accumulation of stores of *war-material* of every kind at depots to be established at inland points, easily accessible by ourselves for distribution, and easily defensible from an enemy.

VII. Providing for strict regulations by which the militia of the several states may more readily and efficiently become incorporated with the regular forces in time of emergency. It is also suggested and urged that state constabularies relieve the militia from ordinary police duties.

The details of method for the carrying out of these and other only less essential provisions should be left largely to a board to consist of chairmen of committees of the House and Senate most directly interested, the secretaries of war and the navy, and those officers of high rank in both services whose position and experience qualify them to suggest or decide between expedients.

While undoubtedly the considerable increase of the army as above outlined would add largely to the expense, several methods of economy may be suggested. That provision concerning length of service as applied to the land forces in general might be materially modified by the establishment of more permanent garrisons "beyond seas"; and a large saving in the item of transportation could be effected by local recruiting. Heretofore, owing to the demands of political expediency numerous small posts, which have long outlived their usefulness, have continued to be garrisoned, entailing in the aggregate a large drain upon funds and men, for both of which better use could be found at stations more suitable, especially for the practise of regimental and brigade evolutions.

Within recent years the quality of men accepted by recruiting officers has very greatly improved; it is suggested that the localizing method of enlistment and the feature of the reserve might still further assist to increase the character, stability and permanency of the men-in-the-ranks. It would be a wise measure to afford to young enlisted men very greatly increased opportunities to attain commissioned rank, and if inclination led and natural ability permitted, that many such should find the way open to making their country's defending a life career. For the so-called "scientific corps"—the engineers, the ordnance, and the artillery—long and arduous training is required; but for the line—foot and horse troops two years or so of due diligence is sufficient. Here the extremely high standard of education at West Point could well be modified. Moral character, physical stamina, a fair general education, with natural capac-

ity for command and willingness to obey; these furnish an ample foundation for the sort of training qualifying for commissioned rank in the line. For advancement to higher grades in the service the experience of the war-between-the-states testifies that time may be trusted to provide its sure tests of merit quite irrespective of that detriment to efficiency—the handicap of seniority as determining promotion.

To make provision for establishing “peace on earth and good will” between nation and nation is no more vital to-day than it has been since first the interests and passions of men began to call for enlightened self-control. And to provide for defense against a world mad with murder, abandoning its own mutual guarantees of civilization is now hardly more essential than it has been for many decades. But the recent shameless spectacle of reversion to barbarism exhibited to-day in Europe and on the high seas has aroused attention to our weakness as never before. It is no fit reply to those who announce the necessity of adequate preparation to cry that war is barbaric. It is barbaric; but so long as barbarians remain upon the earth, it will be the duty of enlightenment to provide safeguards against them.